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Chapter 8 
Rulemaking• 
PART I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
A. The Rulemaking Process 
1. Consideration of Comments 
Those unhappy with the outcome of a rulemaking are quick to assume, 
and assert, that their comments were ignored. Such objections usually fail, 
and the past year's cases were no exception.' Indeed, in one Ninth Circuit 
case the agency actually lost the submissions of four commenters, failing to 
refer or respond to them and not listing them in the docket. The court did 
hold that this was error, but found it harmless because the issues raised in the 
missing comments were duplicative.2 In addition, the D.C. Circuit implicitly 
held th<!,t an agency can ignore comments directed to the constitutionality of 
the underlying statute, though not of the proposed regulation itself.3 In at 
least one case, however, a court of appeals set aside a rule because the agency 
had failed to adequately address comments.4 
* By Michael Herz, Professor, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University 
(Committee Chair). 
1. See, e.g., City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quickly 
dismissing claim that agency had offered only a "general and generic" 
response to comments on proposed Safe Drinking Water Act standard). 
2. Safari Aviation Inc. v. Garvey, 300 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting 
garden-variety challenge because agency adequately considered comments 
and explained its decision). 
3. Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995, 997 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding that petition-
ers, who had not participated in the notice-and-comment rulemaking, had 
waived their constitutional challenge to arsenic regulation promulgated 
under the Safe Drinking Water Act but not their challenge to the Act itself). 
4. Louisiana Fed. Land Bank Ass ' n v. Farm Credit Admin., 336 F.3d 1075, 
1080-81 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
129 
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2. Logical Outgrowth Requirement 
A final rule must be the "logical outgrowth" of the proposal; otherwise, 
interested parties are effectively denied notice and so an opportunity to com-
ment.5 An interesting refinement of the basic principle occurred in Judge 
Posner's opinion in Alto Dairy v. Veneman. 6 This was a challenge by dairies 
to amendment of milk marketing orders, established through formal 
rulemaking, asserting inadequate notice. The lengthy opinion consists prima-
rily of potshots at milk regulation and an in-depth consideration of whether 
Congress had precluded judicial review. But three paragraphs at the end con-
sider the logical outgrowth issue. The court's blackletter statements are fa-
miliar: "[n]otice is adequate if it apprises interested parties of the issues to be 
addressed in the rulemaking proceeding with sufficient clarity and specificity 
to allow them to participate in the rulemaking in a meaningful and informed 
manner."7 Were the agency unable to shift its position, the whole exercise 
would be pointless. 
As always, the particular determination is quite fact-bound, but the court 
emphasizes the need for agency flexibility. The most interesting feature of 
the opinion is its holding that the adequacy of notice is subjective. Judge 
Posner expressly states that the technical terms used in the preamble to the 
proposed rule are "gobbledygook to an outsider."8 However, the petitioning 
dairies were insiders; they would have understood the terms of art. So they 
had notice, even if you and I did not. (This subjective approach finds support 
in section 553(b)'s allowance of actual notice of proposed rulemaking in lieu 
of publication in the Federal Register.) 
City of Waukesha v. EPA9 concerned radionucleide standards issued un-
5. See, e.g., id. at 1081-82 (finding that final rule that made changes that were 
less sweeping than had been proposed satisfied the logical outgrowth re-
quirement because it was a "natural subset" of the proposal and the agency 
had never indicated that it would take an "all or nothing" approach); Envt' l 
Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 319 F.3d 398, 448 (9th Cir. 2003) (final rule satisfied 
logical outgrowth test where preamble to proposed regulation indicated 
that EPA was considering approach it ultimately adopted). 
6. 336 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 2003). This case is also discussed herein in Agricul-
ture (infra 173-75). 
7. Id. at 569 (quoting Am. Med. Ass'n v. United States, 887 F.2d 760, 767 (7th 
Cir. I 989)) . 
8. Id. at 570. 
9. 320 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003). This case is also discussed herein in Environ-
mental and Natural Resources Regulation (infra 324). 
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der the Safe Drinking Water Act. The Act requires a cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA), and EPA ran the numbers for possible standards of 20, 40, and 80 
micrograms per liter (mg/L). It took comments thereon, then promulgated a 
standard of 30 mg/L, contemporaneously issuing a CBA for it. That analysis 
drew on the same underlying data as the ones previously issued. The petition-
ers argued that they had not had the opportunity to comment on the CBA for 
30 mg/L. Viewed as a logical outgrowth argument, this claim is simply goofy; 
absent unusual circumstances, a final rule splitting the difference between 
two proposals is a classic example of something that is the logical outgrowth 
and was entirely predictable. What made the argument somewhat stronger 
was that the Act expressly requires that an opportunity be provided to com-
ment on the cost-benefit analysis; literally, that had not occurred. Nonethe-
less, the court upheld the rule. 
Two aspects of its ruling are of general interest. First, it held that the 
familiar APA logical outgrowth test applies even where another statute has its 
own independent notice-and-comment requirements. 10 Second, the petition-
ers were unable to identify anything they would have said about the CBA for 
the final standard that they had not said regarding the CBAs on which EPA 
did take comment. The court did not hold that this inability in itself estab-
lished that the final rule was the logical outgrowth of proposal, but it did, 
appropriately, find it relevant to that conclusion. 
3. A Rule's "Effective Date" under the Congressional Review Act 
Both actual practice and case law under the Congressional Review Act 11 
remain quite underdeveloped. An interesting question about the Act's collateral 
consequences was raised in Liesegang v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs. 12 The 
Agent Orange Act provided that certain regulations issued thereunder "shall be 
effective on the date of issuance," 13 which the agency read to mean the date of 
publication in the Federal Register. However, the Congressional Review Act 
states that no major rule "shall take effect" until 60 days after it is presented to 
Congress or published in the Federal Register. 14 Here the Department, strug-
gling to meet a statutory deadline that it missed by about a month, got a final 
rule into the May 8, 2001 Federal Register. Because the Department published 
I 0. Id. at 245. 
11. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2000). 
12. 312 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
13. 38 U.S.C. § l l 16(c)(2) (2000). 
14. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3)(A) (2000). 
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the rule without first laying it before Congress, it made its effective date July 9, 
2001 , to accommodate the CRA's 60-day waiting period. The selection of the 
effective date mattered to certain beneficiaries; the statute allowed them to 
receive benefits for the period before they filed a claim, but not before the 
effective date of the new regulation. Accordingly, the effective date of the 
regulation marked the date from which their benefits would run. 
With reasoning resonant with nineteenth century formalism, the court 
held that the 60-day waiting period mandated by the CRA delays a rule's 
operative date but not its effective date. Thus, a rule' s effective date is not the 
date that it "takes effect." The CRA delayed the latter until July 9; but once 
the rule had become operative, it allowed benefits to begin on May 8, be-
cause, under the Agent Orange Act, its effective date was the date of publica-
tion in the Federal Register. 
This is a rather inconsequential setting with sympathetic facts-"deserv-
ing" beneficiaries, an agency that required congressional prodding and had 
missed a deadline, a result in keeping with the overall statutory goal. But the 
overformal distinction drawn by the court really amounts to the authorization 
of retroactive rulemaking. It is impossible to read the CRA itself and its 
reference to the rule's "taking effect" as the sort of explicit congressional 
authorization that the Supreme Court has said retroactive rulemaking re-
quires.15 The case may be an aberration or prove limited to its facts. But on 
its face it seems to eliminate the delay resulting from the 60-day requirement, 
permitting an agency to publish a final rule without waiting for congressional 
review, wait 60 days, then proceed as if the rule had been in place all along. 16 
4. Publication 
The APA requires that final rules be published and forbids enforcement 
of an unpublished rule against anyone lacking "actual and timely notice of 
the terms" of the regulation. 17 Actual notice cases are few and far between, 
but the First Circuit recently decided one. On April 26, 2001 , the Coast 
Guard issued a regulation establishing a temporary security zone off the is-
land of Vieques. The regulation was published in the May 3, 2001 Federal 
Register. On April 28, two fishermen entered into the prohibited area, skirt-
15. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. , 488 U.S. 204 (1988). 
16. This approach would , of course, still be limited by the APA requirement 
that a rule cannot take effect until 30 days after publication unless it grants 
or recognizes an exemption or relieves a restriction , or for good cause. 5 
U.S.C. § 553(d)(l), (2) (2000). 
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ing clearly marked Coast Guard vessels that attempted to stop them by wav-
ing their arms, using hand signals, and shouting, "Security zone, stop your 
boat." It is a federal crime to enter a military security zone, and the fishermen 
were convicted. On appeal they challenged the validity of the regulation that 
established the security zone, which was only published almost week after 
the incident. The court held that the defendants received actual notice via the 
Coast Guard's efforts to keep them out of the security zone. 18 This is a some-
what generous reading of the exception, potentially subject to abuse, and of 
borderline constitutionality; the result should be read in light of the setting 
and the deference so often granted the military. 19 
B. Exceptions to Notice-and-Comment Requirements 
"[l]nterpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency 
organization, procedure, or practice" are exempt from the APA's notice-and-
comment requirements.20 During the past year, as usual, courts struggled to 
figure out just what these things were,21 while in general exhibiting a great 
wariness-perhaps too great a wariness-about agencies circumventing pro-
cedural requirements. 
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(I) (2000). 
18. United States v. Ventura-Melendez, 321 F.3d 230 (1st Cir. 2003). 
I 9. The defendants also argued that the regulation was invalid because it had 
not been subject to notice and comment; the court ruled that the rulemaking 
fell within the military functions exception in section 553(a)(I). That ex-
ception, of course, applies only to the requirements of section 553, not the 
publication requirement of section 552(a)(l ). 
20. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2000). 
21. Or didn't struggle. See, e.g., Reno-Sparks Indian Colony v. EPA, 336 F.3d 
899 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that EPA rule about what constitutes an air 
quality area for purposes of certain Clean Air Act programs clarified but did 
not change existing requirements and so was an interpretive rule exempt 
from notice and comment); Perez v. Ashcroft, 236 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 
2002) (unreasonable agency "interpretation" of existing regulation was a 
substantive rule requiring notice and comment); Caplan v. Dep't of Transp., 
51 Fed. Appx. 320 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (DOT general enforcement policy did 
not require notice and comment); Beverly Health & Rehab Servs., Inc. v. 
Thompson, 223 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C. 2002) (agency protocol a proce-
dural rule excepted from notice-and-comment requirements). 
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1. Categories of Rules 
The Supreme Court offered some meager guidance with respect to the 
distinctions, though not in the context of exceptions to section 553. Whether an 
agency statement is a legislative rule, an interpretive rule, a general statement 
of policy, or something else matters for at least three reasons: whether notice 
and comment is required, whether the statement is ripe or has caused an injury 
sufficient for standing purposes, and what degree of deference a reviewing 
court affords it. In National Park Hospitality Association v. Department of the 
Jnterior, 22 the Court had before it a rule, issued pursuant to notice and comment 
by the National Park Service (NPS). The rule expressed the Park Service's 
view that the Contract Disputes Act (CDA) does not govern agreements be-
tween the Service and park concessionaires. In an opinion by Justice Thomas, 
the Court held that the rule "cannot be a legislative regulation with the force of 
law" because the NPS lacks delegated rulemaking authority under the CDA. 
Nor was it an interpretive rule, because the Park Service has no particular 
authority to administer the CDA, which is a generally applicable statute cover-
ing all federal agencies and overseen by the Administrator of the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy in the Office of Management and Budget. There-
fore, the regulation was, in the words of the Court, "nothing more than a 
'general statement of policy' designed to inform the public of NPS's views on 
the proper application of the CDA."23 The Court held that as such, the rule was 
not ripe for review,24 a potentially important, and questionable, decision re-
garding reviewability. But the opinion is likely to have ripple effects with 
regard to the exceptions to section 553. The distinction between interpretive 
rules and statements of policies is not important for that purpose, since both are 
22. 123 S. Ct. 2026 (2003) . This case is also discussed herein in Judicial Re-
view (supra 94-95) and Environmental and Natural Resources Regulation 
(infra 325-26). 
23. Id. at 2031 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A)). 
24. The NPS had followed notice-and-comment procedures, and petitioners 
did not make a procedural challenge. The Court held that because the rule 
lacked the force of law, it had no meaningful , immediate adverse effects on 
the concessionaires; if and when a particular concessionaire finds itself in 
a contract dispute with the NPS, it can seek to take advantage of the CDA. 
Should the NPS stick to its position that the CDA is inapplicable (which it 
is not legally obligated to do), the legal battle can take place then. Justice 
Stevens concurred ; he thought the rule was ripe for review but that the 
petitioners lacked standing because they had not suffered an injury in fact. 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented, arguing that the ripe-
ness and standing requirements were both satisfied. 
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exempt. What is important is the heavy emphasis on the congressional assign-
ment of rulemaking or interpretive authority. 
2. Invalid Legislative Rules 
Several decisions found that rules that the agency had characterized as 
interpretive were invalid for failure to follow notice and comment. For ex-
ample, in Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 25 the D.C. Circuit set aside an FCC order 
governing the method for compensating pay-phone service providers for coinless 
calls made from pay phones. The court found that the FCC was not merely 
clarifying earlier rules but flatly altering existing payment arrangements. The 
court expressed concern about eviscerating notice-and-comment requirements, 
either through a broad understanding of the exception for interpretive rules or 
through a broad understanding of the harmless error standard, concluding that 
a showing of actual prejudice to the telephone companies was not required. 
Similarly, in Hemp Industries Association v. Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration,26 the Ninth Circuit declared invalid a Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration "interpretive rule." THC is listed as a banned substance on Schedule I 
under the Controlled Substances Act. After examining the legislative and 
regulatory history of Schedule I, the court concluded that Schedule I covered 
only synthetic THC. A Drug Enforcement Administration interpretive rule 
purported to read Schedule I to apply to naturally occurring THC as well. 
The court relied on the well-known D.C. Circuit opinion in American Min-
ing Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Administration27 to determine whether 
the rule had "the force of law" and therefore was a legislative rule requiring 
notice and comment. Of the factors the American Mining court had identified 
(whether enforcement action would be possible absent the rule, whether the 
agency explicitly invoked its general rulemaking authority, and whether the 
rule amends a prior legislative rule), the Ninth Circuit focused on the third. 
The DEA's rule was flatly inconsistent with, and therefore effectively amended, 
an existing legislative regulation. Accepting the court's reading of the statute 
and regulations,28 the court's decision is clearly correct. However, as always 
25 . 315 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
26. 333 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003). This case is also discussed herein in Agricul-
ture (infra 182-83). 
27. 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
28 . Bill Jordan has suggested that the meaning of the statute and regulations 
was not as clear as the court believed, and that the court ought to have 
deferred to the agency interpretation. See William S. Jordan III, News from 
the Circuits , 29 ADMIN & REG. L. N EWS at 19, 20 (Fall 2003). 
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in these sorts of cases, the court need not have found that the regulation was 
"an invalid legislative rule"; it could simply have said that the interpretation 
was unreasonable and stopped there.29 
More striking, and troubling, was Croplife America v. EPA.30 This was a 
challenge to an EPA directive, announced in a press release, concerning reli-
ance on human studies in evaluating the safety of pesticides. Historically, the 
agency had relied on human studies; it had then shifted to a case-by-case 
approach, which it confirmed in October 2001. Then, in mid-December of 
that year, it announced that it would not consider or rely on third-party hu-
man studies pending review by the National Academy of Sciences of the 
ethical issues they pose. The decision pleased environmental groups and upset 
pesticide manufacturers, several of whom challenged the new policy in the 
D.C. Circuit. The court set aside the new policy, characterizing it as a "bind-
ing regulation that is directly aimed at and enforceable against petitioners"3 1 
that required notice and comment. It ordered EPA to return to its prior case-
by-case policy. 32 
This decision is questionable in two respects. First, it was rather quick to 
dismiss the agency's claim that the press release was merely a "policy state-
ment," adopting a strikingly broad understanding of which regulations are 
"binding" and "enforceable" and therefore legislative. The new approach was 
a moratorium, pending further investigation and consultation, on a practice 
that the agency had come to see as highly problematic. Requiring the agency 
to conduct a notice-and-comment rulemaking before adopting such a policy 
denies the agency important flexibility. 
Second, the court did not even consider whether (and, as far as one can 
tell from the opinion, the agency did not argue that) the new policy was a 
29. See generally William Funk, When Is a "Rule" a Regulation? Marking a 
Clear Line Between Nonlegislative Rules and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. 
L. REv. 659, 663-67 (2001) (arguing that courts should not invalidate "leg-
islative rules" that were not promulgated pursuant to notice and comment, 
but should instead simply not allow agencies to enforce them as if they had 
the force of law). 
30. 329 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2003). This case is also discussed herein in Environ-
mental and Natural Resources Regulation (infra 340-41 ). 
31. Id. at 88 I. 
32. While the case was pending, EPA issued an ANPRM for purposes of under-
taking notice and comment rulemaking on its use of human testing in 
general, not limited to pesticides . See Human Testing ; Advance Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 24,410 (May 7, 2003). 
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procedural rule. After all, it did not limit or constrain the use of any pesticide 
or set substantive standards for doing so. Rather, it established an evidentiary 
practice that would be employed when the agency made substantive deci-
sions. While some substantive impact might be expected-obviously, the pe-
titioners thought the new approach would make it harder to establish their 
products' safety-the EPA announcement certainly looks like a rule of agency 
procedure. The court was preoccupied with the question of whether the press 
release was "binding," which is irrelevant to the question whether it was a 
procedural rule. Procedural rules bind the agency, but, like this press release, 
they do not govern primary behavior or dictate substantive outcomes. 33 
3. Valid Nonlegislative Rules 
A mine operator challenged the validity of "guidelines" (the statutory 
term), issued by the Mine Safety & Health Administration (MSHA) without 
notice and comment, that call for bi-monthly inspections. In Chao v. 
Rothermel, 34 the Third Circuit ruled that the guidelines are not substantive or 
legislative rules. Oddly, it did not say exactly what they are, treating "inter-
pretive" and "procedural" as synonyms. It emphasized that the guidelines do 
not regulate the actual operation of mines. They only set a schedule and 
specify procedures for inspections; they are for use by agency employees 
rather than compliance by regulated entities. The agency had argued that 
Congress had indicated that notice and comment was not required simply by 
its use of the word "guidelines" rather than, say, "regulations." The court 
rejected this argument; it thought that a statutory reference to "regulations" 
or "standards" might implicitly require notice and comment, but a reference 
to "guidelines" does not implicitly exempt it. However, these particular guide-
lines did not constitute a substantive rule. 
All in all, this was not a hard case. Indeed, the clearest category of 
nonlegislative rules consists of agency enforcement policies. I would call 
those policy documents (staff manuals), not "interpretive" or "procedural" 
rules, as the court here does, but its conclusion is correct. 
Somewhat similar, though with an added twist, was Utility Air Regula-
tory Group v. EPA. 35 There an industry group challenged a provision of 
EPA's Instruction Manual for Permit Application Forms, which guided agency 
33. The decision is in significant tension with Utility Air Regulatory Group v. 
EPA, discussed infra. 
34. 327 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2003). 
35. 320 F.3d 272 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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officials considering applications for Clean Air Act permits. The interpreta-
tion had to do with what sort of monitoring requirements can be included in 
permits. The court found that the Manual was a policy statement, not a bind-
ing regulation. 36 It did not bind the agency or regulated entities but only 
indicated the policy the agency hoped to implement in future rulemakings or 
adjudications. This understanding of the Manual seems fair; it reflected a 
view policy or legal view that was to be implemented in individual adjudica-
tions. I would only note that exactly the same thing could have been said of 
the press release set aside in CropL(fe. 
What is most striking about the Utility Air Regulatory Group decision is 
not this fairly straightforward characterization of the Manual , but its conse-
quence. The petitioners were bringing a substantive rather than a procedural 
challenge. Thus, the court's reasoning did not lead to the conclusion that 
notice and comment was not required. Rather, the court held that because the 
Manual was not binding, the petitioners had not been injured and, therefore, 
lacked standing to bring the challenge, which was also unripe. The Supreme 
Court reached a similar result in National Park Hospitality Association.31 
Read for all they are worth, these decisions could mean that items cov-
ered by section 553(b)(3)(A) are not only exempt from notice-and-comment 
procedures, but may also be effectively immune from judicial review be-
cause they do not bind the agency and therefore do not injure anyone. Such 
an outcome would conflict with both good sense38 and existing case law 
(although the possible non-reviewability of interpretive rules has usually been 
analyzed in terms of ripeness and finality rather than standing). 39 
These decisions are in sharp contrast with one of the weirder cases of the 
year, the Eighth Circuit's decision in South Dakota v. Ubbelohde,40 which is 
36. The Manual in fact rested on an interpretation of EPA's regulations, which 
received significant attention from the court. Therefore, it might better 
have been characterized an interpretive rule. 
37. 123 S. Ct. 2026 (2003); see supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
38 . See Peter L. Strauss , Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: As-
suring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REY . 803, 
817-22 (2001) . 
39. See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (reviewing interpretive rule); Nat'! Automatic Laundry & Clean-
ing Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that advisory 
letters from the Administrator of the Wage & Hour Administration of the 
Department of Labor were ripe for review even though they were interpre-
tive rules). 
40. 330 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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one part of extensive multi-district litigation over the allocation of water in 
the Missouri River by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps found 
itself subject to a set of conflicting injunctions from various district courts, 
many (but not all) of which were consolidated on appeal to the Eighth Cir-
cuit. The Corps argued that the allocation decision was committed entirely to 
its discretion and that its decisions were not judicially reviewable. The Eighth 
Circuit found otherwise, discovering "law to apply" in the Corps' "Master 
Manual." The Manual, which is an internal document adopted without full-
fledged notice and comment, provides criteria for allocation decisions. Strik-
ingly, the court did not just reason that a failure to explain abandonment of a 
policy set out in the Manual would be arbitrary and capricious, it treated the 
Manual as absolutely binding on the Corps. While the Corps tried to charac-
terize the Manual as a nonbinding policy statement, the court treated it as a 
legislative rule. It emphasized that the Manual's language was mandatory, 
full of "shalls" and "wills"; that it was adopted through a species of notice 
and comment, and that the agency itself had treated it as binding. Thus, the 
court seems to treat the Manual as a legislative rule, judicially enforceable 
under the principle that an agency is bound by its own regulations. 
This reasoning is just the opposite of that found in cases in Part 2, supra. 
In those cases, an agency sought to rely on an interpretive rule and the court 
said the rule was procedurally invalid. Here the agency sought to avoid a 
policy statement and the court held the agency to it, even though the APA's 
requirements for legislative rules had not been complied with. If the Manual 
really is a substantive rule, it is a procedurally invalid one. 
4. A Failed Effort to Limit Alaska Professional Hunters 
In Alaska Professional Hunters Association v. FAA, 41 the D.C. Circuit held 
that when an agency alters its interpretation of its own long-standing regula-
tion, the change requires notice and comment. (This rule differs from the Ameri-
can Mining Congress holding in that it involves the abandonment of one 
permissible interpretation of an existing regulation for another, not a spurious 
"interpretation" of an existing rule that actually is inconsistent with, and so 
changes, that rule.) The principle has been much criticized,42 and continues to 
41. 177 F.3d I 030 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
42. See, e.g., Jon Connolly, Note: Alaska Hunters and the D.C. Circuit: A De-
fense of Flexible Interpretive Rulemaking, IOI CoLUM. L. REV. 155 (2001); 
Jordan, supra note 28, at 20 (calling this case and its progeny a "virus that 
... continues to mutate doctrinally and expand geographically"). 
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pose problems. A nice-try-but-no-cigar effort to limit the case occurred in 
lynegar v. Barnhart.43 In general, the Social Security Administration will issue 
Social Security numbers (SSNs) to legal aliens only when they are allowed to 
work in the United States. Under a long-standing regulation, however, an alien 
not permitted to work can still obtain an SSN if needed "for a valid nonwork 
purpose." A 1980 agency manual gave as an example of "valid nonwork pur-
pose" applying for a state driver's license. That example recurred in various 
internal manuals over the years, and it was the agency's practice to provide 
SSNs to legal aliens who needed them to obtain a driver's license. Then in 
March 2002 the agency revised its Record Maintenance manual and listed ob-
taining a driver's license as an invalid nonwork purpose, stating that the agency 
"will not assign an SSN solely for these purposes." In lynegar, Judge Huvelle 
ruled that the change was invalid because it was not made pursuant to notice-
and-comment procedures, relying on Alaska Professional Hunters and its prog-
eny. The agency had directly reversed a definitive and long-standing interpretation 
of the regulation. 
The government argued that the Alaska Professional Hunters rule ap-
plies only when the agency has changed its interpretation as a result of a 
policy change implemented by a new presidential administration. Judge Huvelle 
observed that nothing in the D.C. Circuit's decisions said this, and that it did 
not really help the government on the facts here. Still, it is an interesting 
theory. It is really the direct opposite of then-Justice Rehnquist's famous 
dissent in State Farm. 44 He had argued that precisely because the withdrawal 
of the passive restraints rule was obviously the result of the arrival of a new 
administration, it required no more explanation than that. The majority did 
not respond to Rehnquist directly, but implicitly it required at least as full an 
explanation when a shift in administrations lies behind a shift in regulatory 
requirements. So here one might read Alaska Hunters as requiring fuller 
process when the political explanation is so prominent, but only then. Judge 
Huvelle would have none of it, but this argument might resurface. 
5. Good Cause 
Good-cause cases are, in their nature, highly fact-bound; courts repeat a 
steady mantra that the inquiry "proceeds case-by-case, sensitive to the totality 
of the factors at play."45 Thus, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
43 . 233 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2002). 
44. Motor Vehicle Mfrs . Ass' n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S . 29, 59 
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) . 
45 . Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 316 F.3d 904, 911 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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recently found · itself winning one and losing one in quite similar circum-
stances.46 
The Ocean Conservancy v. Evans41 involved annual quotas set by NMFS 
limiting the commercial catch of sharks in the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of 
Mexico. In late 2001 the Service promulgated a rule establishing the 2002 
quota, invoking the good-cause exception to excuse the absence of notice and 
comment. The district court accepted the Service's explanation that it had 
had to await the completion of various scientific studies, that it was necessary 
to get a rule out for the start of the fishing season on January 1, 2002, and 
that any delay would have meant leaving in place a lower, more restrictive 
quota that could have had significant economic impacts. On the other hand, 
much the same factors were found not to add up to good cause in Natural 
Resources Defense Counsel v. Evans. 48 Here the challenge was to an NMFS 
rule establishing specifications and management measures for the Pacific Coast 
Groundfish Fishery. "[G]ood cause requires some showing of exigency be-
yond generic complexity of data collection and time constraints; notice and 
comment must interfere with the agency's ability to fulfill its statutory man-
date to manage the fishery."49 This is not a bad formulation; it at least pro-
vides a hierarchy-the need to fulfill the substantive statutory mandate trumps 
the need to fulfill procedural requirements. 
46. While these cases appear to arise on very similar facts, they are not neces-
sarily inconsistent. Given the fact-intensive, totality-of-the-circumstances 
nature of the good-cause inquiry, there will always be considerations that 
do not make it into the opinion but legitimately affect the decision. One 
attorney familiar with these cases points out that the NFS relies on the 
good-cause exception in as much as one-third of its rulemakings and that 
the argument for the exemption in the Florida case was particularly strong 
in light of the long hi story of the litigation and the possibility that further 
delay there might have led to a contempt citation. Personal communica-
tion from Daniel Cohen, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Nov. 3, 2003. 
47. 260 F. Supp. 2d 1162 (M.D. Fla. 2003). 
48. 316 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2003). This case is also discussed herein in Environ-
mental and Natural Resources Regulation (infra 330). 
49. Id. at 906. Cf Bohner v. Daniels, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (D. Or. 2003) (reject-
ing reliance on good-cause exception where the agency had not explicitly 
invoked the exception or explained why it applied at the time it issued 
"interim rule"); Air India v. Brien, 261 F. Supp. 2d 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(rejecting agency reliance on good-cause exception) . 
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C. Rulemaking, Adjudication, and the Eleventh Amendment 
Two years ago, in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State 
Ports Authority (FMC),50 the Supreme Court continued its expansion of the 
states' immunity from federal adjudications, holding that a federal agency, 
like a federal court, cannot adjudicate a claim by a private party against a 
non-consenting state. The agency itself can pursue administrative enforce-
ment against the state, but private parties cannot. The decision might be an 
impetus, if a marginal one, away from adjudication and toward rulemaking. 
One recent decision indicates a model for such a move while also helping 
define the limits of FMC. 
The Federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Act51 contains an un-
usual provision regarding the preemption of state law. Any person directly 
affected by a state requirement can apply to the Secretary of Transportation 
for a determination as to whether the state provision is preempted.52 The 
Secretary must publish notice of the application in the Federal Register and, 
under DOT's regulations, receive and consider comments.53 The Secretary's 
decision is judicially reviewable. Alternatively, any person can bypass the 
Secretary altogether and seek a judicial ruling on preemption directly.54 
A Tennessee trade association sought a determination from the Secretary 
that Tennessee's annual fee on persons with hazardous waste transportation 
permits was preempted. After the required notice and comment, the Secre-
tary concluded the fee was preempted. The state sought judicial review, argu-
ing, among other things, that it was immune from this administrative process 
under FMC. In Tennessee v. U.S. Department of Transportation, 55 the Sixth 
Circuit disagreed. It emphasized that (1) the decisionmaker was the Secretary 
himself, an administrator carrying out an executive task, rather than a neu-
tral, apolitical, judicially immune ALJ, and (2) the preemption determination 
does not finally determine the rights and responsibilities of individual parties 
or produce an enforceable order; it is only a prospective agency legal inter-
pretation. Thus, unlike the standard agency adjudication, this did not "walk, 
talk, and squawk like a lawsuit"; it was essentially a rulemaking, and so did 
not trigger state immunity. 
50. 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
51. 49 u.s.c. §§ 5101-5127 (2000) . 
52. Id. § 5125(d)(l). 
53. Notice, 49 C.F.R. § 107.205 (2003). 
54. 49 U.S.C. §§ 5125(d)(3), (t) (2000). 
55. 326 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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The decision seems correct. To be sure, this apparently unique mecha-
nism does have an adjudicatory flavor; it involves the application of general 
legal principles to a specific setting (though, oddly, not a factual setting but a 
legal one), the applicant must serve a copy of the application on the state, the 
final determination must "include[] a written statement setting forth the rel-
evant facts and the legal basis for the determination,"56 and it involves a 
determination that might easily otherwise be made in an adjudication (for 
example, where a permit-holder who refused to pay the fee relied on preemp-
tion as a defense in an enforcement action). However, this is really the issu-
ance of an interpretive rule, one with no consequences unless and until relied 
on in an actual adjudication. Were the court to have ruled otherwise, it would 
seem to immunize states from the application of interpretive rules by federal 
agencies. The Sixth Circuit rightly steered clear of such an unfortunate and 
unjustified extension of the FMC immunity. 
D. The Choice between Rulemaking and Adjudication 
It is hornbook law that agencies can choose between rulemaking and 
adjudication for making policy. But, like all general propositions of adminis-
trative law, this one is subject to any specific provision to the contrary. Such 
a provision was at issue in Ethyl Corporation v. EPA.51 
The Clean Air Act and EPA regulations limit tailpipe emissions from 
new cars; section 206 of the Act requires EPA to test new cars to ensure they 
will comply with the standards throughout their "useful life." The section 
specifically states that EPA "shall by regulation establish methods and proce-
dures for making tests under this section."58 EPA conducted a notice-and-
comment rulemaking, issuing a regulation establishing a "Compliance 
Assurance Program," or "CAP 2000," under which each individual manufac-
turer would propose a particular testing methodology to EPA, and EPA would 
approve or disapprove these submissions on a case-by-case basis. The regula-
tion set out general requirements for the tests but did not specify particular 
tests or procedures. In short, the EPA set up a de facto informal adjudication 
process for determining the particular testing procedures that each manufac-
turer would use for its vehicles. 
The D.C. Circuit held that EPA had failed to comply with the statutory 
mandate to establish testing methods and procedures "by regulation." The 
56. Determination, 49 C.F.R. § 107.209(b) (2003). 
57 . 306 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7525(d) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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court found the case easy; EPA's determination that open rulemaking proce-
dures would be administratively burdensome, and its concern over protecting 
trade secrets of individual manufacturers, had to yield to the plain congres-
sional directive. There is also just a hint of suspicion over the lack of trans-
parency and openness that would result from "short-circuit[ing]" the rulemaking 
process and substituting "a cluster of closed bargaining sessions."59 So, when 
Congress says something must be done by regulation, it must be done by 
regulation. 
E. "Formal Notice and Comment" 
A striking and meaningful change in the terminology of rulemaking, 
evident for some time, was more on display than ever during the past year: 
the use of the term "formal" to describe section 553 notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. The Supreme Court has done it,60 and it is in good company. A 
LEXIS search in the federal courts library for the (one would have thought 
oxymoronic) phrase "formal notice and comment" turned up 38 instances 
during the five-year period from 1999 to 2003; 18 instances from 1989 to 
1993; eight instances from 1979 to 1983; and zero from 1969 to 1973. This 
new usage reflects three things, I think. First, traditional "formal rulemaking," 
that is, rulemaking pursuant to sections 556 and 557, has virtually disap-
peared; therefore, that phrase does not have a technical meaning readily avail-
able to generalists. Second, agencies increasingly rely on non-legislative rules. 
As a result, in the real world the two categories of rulemaking are notice and 
comment or nothing. As between those two, notice and comment is the more 
formal, all the more so with the growth of analytic requirements and "ossifi-
cation" of what was originally a bare-bones process. The third factor is the 
developing law of Chevron, Christensen, and Mead, which invite discussion 
of the "formality" with which an agency has adopted a regulation in consid-
ering the appropriate level of deference. 61 
Thus, in rulemaking, as in dress codes, yesterday's informal is today 's 
formal. I neither lament nor celebrate this shift, but merely report it. 
59. Id. at 1150. 
60. Washington State Dep' t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of 
Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003) (noting that " [ w ]hile these administra-
tive interpretations [embodied in agency's Operations Manual] are not prod-
ucts of formal rulemaking, they nevertheless warrant respect"). 
61. See the discuss ion of these three well-known cases in Administrative Law 
Discussion Forum, 54 ADMIN. L. R EV . 565-882 (2002). 
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PART II. ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
A. E-Rulemaking 
For some years, agencies have been shifting toward electronic rulemaking. 
There has been no single watershed event or year in this transformation. But 
the past year saw a sort of "knee of the curve," in which electronic rulemaking 
became very much the norm.62 Dozens of federal agencies now accept com-
ments on proposed regulations in electronic format and maintain an electronic 
docket containing copies of comments and other relevant material; under the 
E-Govemment Act, all agencies are to have electronic dockets in place by 
March 2004-at least, "to the extent practicable." At many agency Web sites, it 
is a relatively simple matter to learn the status of pending rulemakings and, in 
some cases, to search the titles or even the text of materials that have been 
docketed. 63 A dozen or more agencies also maintain subject- or docket-specific 
listservs, so that subscribers receive e-mail notices of submissions, deadlines, 
or agency actions.64 While improvement is needed in user-friendliness, the 
shift to e-rulemaking has undeniably made it far easier to learn about agency 
rulemakings, obtain relevant materials, and submit comments. 
In addition to the growth of e-rulemaking efforts within individual agen-
cies, a coordinated, government-wide undertaking made significant progress 
during the last year. In July 2001, the Office of Management and Budget 
(0MB) established an E-Government Task Force, headed by the newly cre-
ated Associate Director for Information Technology and E-Government.65 
62. A valuable collection of information and monographs concerning e-
rulemaking is available (online, of course) at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ 
cbg/rpp/erulemaking/home.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). For an excel-
lent general discussion, see Barbara H. Brandon & Robert D. Carlitz, Online 
Rulemaking and Other Tools for Strengthening Civil Infrastructure, 54 
ADMIN. L. REV. 142) (2002) . 
63. Individual agencies' e-rulemaking sites can be accessed from links at the 
Web site of the Federal Register. See http://www.archives.gov/ 
federal_register/public_participation/rulemaking_sites.html (last visited 
Nov. 2 I , 2003). 
64. See http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/public_participation/ 
rulemaking_email.html (providing links to agency rulemaking Iistervs) 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
65. See Memorandum from Mitchell E. Daniels, 0MB Director, to Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies (July I 8, 200 I). The initial appoin-
tee, Mark Forman, left in August 2003 and was replaced by Karen Evans, 
who had been Chief Information Officer at the Department of Energy. 
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The E-Government Act thereafter created within 0MB an Office of Elec-
tronic Government, headed by a presidentially appointed Administrator.66 
In October, the President's Management Council approved a set of recom-
mendations from the Task Force, leading finally to the publication in February 
2002 of a document entitled "E-Govemment Strategy." The Strategy, a revised 
version of which was released in April 2003,67 identified 24 projects, of which 
one is "Online Rulemaking Management." The Department of Transportation 
was originally the "managing partner" for the initiative; EPA took over in late 
2002. The first, easy step was to include links to individual agency e-dockets 
from www.firstgov.gov. The much harder second step was to create a single 
Web site from which individuals could find, review, and submit comments on 
proposed rules from all federal agencies. That site, www.regulations.gov, went 
online on January 23, 2003. The regulations.gov portal is built on notices of 
proposed rules that are submitted to the Office of the Federal Register. Users 
can search by keyword, topic, or agency. A search produces an entry for each 
pending proposal that fits the search criteria; the entry identifies the agency, 
subject matter, affected section of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), date 
of proposal, date by which comments are due, a link to the text of the Federal 
Register notice (in both pdf and html format), and a link for the submission of 
comments. The site also links to the up-to-date text of the CFR. The site was 
one of 20 winners of a 2003 "E-Govemment Pioneer Award" from the FCW 
Media Group, host of "e-gov.com."68 
Regulations.gov has been a mixed success.69 On the one hand, a lot of 
66. 44 U .S .C.A. § 3602(a) (2003). The Administrator of this office and the 
Associate Director are the same person. 
67. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPLEMENTING THE 
PRESIDENT' S MANAGEMENT AGENDA FORE-GOVERNMENT: E-GOVERNMENT STRATEGY 
(2003) , available at http ://www.whitehouse .gov/omb/inforeg/ 
egovstrategy.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2003) [hereinafter E-GovERNMENT STRAT-
EGY]. 
68 . See Press Release, E-Gov 2003 Awards Innovations in E-Government, avail-
able at http:/ /www.e-gov.com/events/2003/egov /for_press/press_room .asp 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2003). Oddly, EPA's own E-Docket site was also given 
an award, but as a "trailblazer" rather than a "pioneer." The nuanced dis-
tinction between a trailblazer and a pioneer (not to mention the third cat-
egory, "explorer") is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
69. A useful , somewhat critical assessment, based on the first three months of 
the site's operation , is U.S . General Accounting Office, Electronic 
Rulemaking: Efforts to Facilitate Public Participation Can Be Improved 
(Sept. 2003) (GAO-03-90 I), available at http://www.senate.gov/-govt-aff/ 
_files/d0390 lgao.pdf) (last visited Nov. 15, 2003). 
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people are looking at it: in the first three months or so of operation, it had 
millions of hits.70 On the other hand, most electronic commenters rely on the 
agencies' own Web sites. For example, during the first three months of op-
eration EPA received only eight comments through regulations.gov and the 
Department of Transportation only 21 (while receiving 16,000 electronic 
comments at its own Web site).71 This is not a surprise, since the agency sites 
tend to have more information and will be known to most, and familiar to 
many, of those interested enough to submit a comment. According to the 
GAO, not all proposed regulations have in fact been available on 
regulations.gov; at the same time, some proposals have been available only 
there and not on the relevant agencies' own sites. 
The administration's e-government strategy envisions an integrated, gov-
ernment-wide docket system that goes beyond regulations.gov. At present, 
that site allows the user to access the Federal Register notice for a proposed 
rule, but not the full docket, which can only be accessed via the agency's own 
Web site. The plan ultimately is to eliminate the agency-specific dockets, 
migrating all into the single, government-wide Web site. This is supposed to 
be done as a trial run for five agencies by September 2004. 72 
The future of this initiative, and of e-rulemaking generally, is hard to 
predict. It is easy to oversell the transformations to be worked by e-
rulemaking.73 Thus far, e-rulemaking represents a new and improved format 
for what is still recognizably the section 553 notice-and-comment process. 
The transformation that e-rulemaking promises, and so far has not accom-
plished, would be to make notice and comment a truly dialogic or delibera-
tive process. A simple step in this direction that e-rulemaking facilitates would 
be to include a rebuttal period as a matter of course, allowing all participants 
to respond to all other participants after the close of the primary comment 
period.74 More ambitiously, some have envisioned electronic rulemaking as a 
70. Just how many is unclear. 0MB states that in its first three months, the site 
had 2.6 million unique visitors. E-GovERNM ENT STRATEGY, supra note 67, at 4 , 
12. 
71. General Accounting Office, supra note 69, at 23-24. 
72. E-GOVERNMENT STRATEG Y, supra note 67 , at 26. 
73 . For example, E-GovERNMENT STRATEGY asserts that "with the implementation 
of the E-Rulemaking initiative, businesses will no longer need the assis-
tance of a lawyer or lobbyist to participate in the regulatory process ." Id. at 
9 . This may be literally true , but meaningful participation, effective and 
sophisticated commenting, and private meetings will still require profes-
sional assistance. 
74. See Brandon & Carlitz, supra note 62, at 1429-30 & nn .32-33. 
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bona fide "dialogue" that becomes truly deliberative, shaping the partici-
pants' views in the process and leading to real consensus.75 That happy day 
remains in the distant future, however. 
The move to e-rulemaking has produced, or seems likely to produce, 
several noteworthy shifts. First, it has saved some money, if only in reduced 
storage needs and personnel to handle all the paper. If the government-wide 
docket is ever put in place, there will be some additional, modest economies 
of scale.76 E-rulemaking has probably also marginally increased public par-
ticipation and transparency as well. However, no one has convincingly dem-
onstrated this to be the case. 
A second consequence has been to help entrench the idea of an informal 
rulemaking "docket." The APA does not provide for such a thing, and histori-
cally it was an incoherent concept, since notice and comment was not an on-
the-record proceeding. Over the last generation-largely as a result of the 
reconception of notice and comment as involving a "paper hearing," both by 
courts and in some specific statutes, such as the Clean Air Act-it has become 
more common to think of informal rulemaking as involving a docket and a 
record. That language and that conception permeate the world of e-rulemaking. 
Thus, the E-Rulemaking Act requires agencies to "make publicly available 
online . .. materials that by agency rule or practice are included in the 
rulemaking docket under section 553(c)"77 (even though there is no such 
thing as a "rulemaking docket under section 553(c)"). EPA's e-rulemaking 
system is known as "E-Docket"; the Department of Transportation has the 
"Docket Management System," etc. 
The third shift concerns the nature of public comment and is more subtle. 
In an e-rulemaking world, because so many people are aware of pending 
rulemakings and commenting is so easy, agencies can be quickly swamped 
with thousands, or hundreds of thousands, of comments. This is the flip side 
of "transparency" and "increased participation." What can realistically be 
expected of an agency dealing with a million comments, thousands of which 
duplicate one another? The old model of careful individual consideration is 
75 . See, e.g., THOMAS C. BEIERLE, DISCUSSING THE RULES: ELECTRONIC RULEMAKING AND 
D EMOCRATIC D ELIBERATION (2003) (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 
03-22) . 
76. 0MB anticipates an $8 million cost savings, plus $3 million in cost avoid-
ance, from decommissioning five agency-specific e-docket systems. E-Gov-
ERNMENT STRATEGY, supra note 67, at 26. 
77 . E-Rulemaking Act § 206(d)(2)(B). 
Chapter 8: Rulemaking 149 
inapplicable. Unavoidably, the agency will start to do what, for example, 
members of Congress do: avoid the subtleties and keep a running tally with 
the grossest sort of division-basically "for" or "against." Many people have 
had the experience of laboring over a well-thought-out, carefully researched, 
elegantly written, heartfelt letter to a member of Congress, one which, in the 
writer's view, must surely sway any reasonable reader---only to receive a 
form letter response that suggested that the letter was unread and misunder-
stood. 
Three sorts of consequences can be expected. The first is purely doctri-
nal. Much of what reviewing courts have said about the need to consider and 
respond to comments will have to be modified. An agency cannot respond to 
a million comments other than generally and generically.78 
Second, the expected savings of time, money, and resources are likely to 
prove elusive. There may be other gains, of course, but the new systems are 
likely to lead to "information overload" that could disable agencies or at least 
slow their decisionmaking. 79 
The third point goes to the nature of the process. Letter-writing to Con-
gress is seen as a sort of proxy for elections. Voters indicate their preferences; 
the fact that someone wrote a letter is not important so much for its content 
but for the signal it gives about the salience of the issue to the letter-writer. 
Historically, notice-and-comment rulemaking has reflected a different model, 
in which what mattered was the substance of the comments.80 However, as 
the comments received on proposed rules increase by orders of magnitude, 
and as they increasingly take the form of hundreds of thousands of identical 
e-mails organized by trade associations or nonprofits, one would expect both 
78. There is one important caveat, however. To the extent that the comments 
are duplicative, the burden of responding is not increased. 
79. Stephen M . Johnson , The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing 
Public Participation and Access to Government Information Through the 
Internet , 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 329 (1998); Jim Rossi, Participation Run 
Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency 
Decisionmaking, 92 Nw L. REV. 173, 224-28 (1997). 
80. As Judge Posner wrote in Alto Dairy, discussed supra at notes 6-8, " [t]he 
purpose of a rulemaking proceeding is not merely to vote up or down the 
specific proposals advanced before the proceeding begins , but to refine , 
modify, and supplement the proposals in the light of evidence and argu-
ments presented in the course of the proceeding." Alto Dairy v. Veneman, 
336 F.3d 560, 569 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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participants and observers to tend toward a more "political" understanding of 
the process. 81 
As many have pointed out, there are two dominant models of the adminis-
trative process. Under the "expertise" model, the agency is a neutral, apolitical, 
technocratic expert. Problems of public policy have right and wrong answers, 
and the chances of identifying and implementing the right one are increased if 
the agency is kept out of the political process. Under the "politics" model, what 
legitimates agency decisions is not their objective correctness according to ex-
perts, but their consistency with popular preferences. Policy decisions are more 
about values than facts, and agencies ought to be subject to political influences. 
Neither model has ever triumphed, though the overall trend has been away 
from the expertise model and toward the politics model. 82 
E-rulemaking can only accelerate this trend. Consider just one recent ex-
ample. After a relatively rapid rulemaking and Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS)-writing process, the U.S. Forest Service issued the so-called "roadless 
rule" in the waning days of the Clinton Administration. The rule restricts road 
construction in almost 60 million acres of Forest Service land. The rule has 
generated a number of legal challenges, with several district judges finding 
defects in the process, 83 and the Bush Administration is considering diluting its 
protections in Alaska. Comments on the proposed rule and/or the Draft EIS, 
and on the current Alaska proposals, numbered in the millions and have been 
overwhelmingly in favor of stringent protections. Press coverage has over-
whelmingly treated the comment process as a sort of vote.84 This conception 
81. See BEIERLE, supra note 75, at l l (lamenting that e-rulemaking produces, 
"at worst, a cacophony of unreflective comments [that] tempts rule writers 
to lapse into preference aggregation, counting up support and disagree-
ment in an inappropriate application of a voting model" ); Randolph J. 
May, Under Pressure: Campaign-style tactics are the wrong way to influ-
ence agency decisions, LEGAL TIMES, July 7, 2003, at 44 (noting, and la-
menting, shift from an expertise model to a politics model, of which efforts 
to bombard rulemaking agencies with duplicative comments are an as-
pect); Rossi, supra note 79, at 238-41. 
82. For one useful general description, see Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to 
Politics: The Transformation of American Rulemaking, 3 l WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 745 (1996). 
83 . See, e.g., Wyoming v. United States Dep' t of Agric., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197 
(D. Wy. 2003); Kootenai Tribe v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D. Idaho 
2001), rev'd, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2002). 
84. For example, an item in the Sierra Club's newsletter was subtitled, "What 
part of l million comments didn't they understand?" Kim Todd, Roadless 
Rule Redux, THE PLANET NEWSLETTER, Sept. 2001, at l. 
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can also be seen in an anucus brief submitted to the Ninth Circuit in Kootenai 
Tribe by the Montana Attorney General. The brief's basic point had nothing to 
do with legality, but came down to this: "Hey, Montanans overwhelmingly 
support this rule, as shown by tabulating our comments during the process." 
Emphasizing that 67 percent of comrnenters in Montana (and 96 percent na-
tionwide) favored stronger protections than were anticipated in the Draft EIS, 
and that the Forest Service responded by strengthening protections, the brief 
concludes that the rule is "the product of public rulemaking at its most effec-
tive."85 What's more, the Ninth Circuit placed some weight on this argu-
ment.86 
In short, the new technology is forcing agencies toward a particular model 
of the process and function of rulemaking, as opposed to enabling agencies to 
better function under the model chosen independent of that technology. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DATA QUALITY ACT 
The Data Quality Act (DQA) requires 0MB to issue "Government-wide 
guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objec-
tivity, utility, and integrity of information (including statistical information) 
disseminated by Federal agencies."87 Agencies must then produce their own 
guidelines to achieve those information-quality goals; the agencies must also 
establish a mechanism by which affected persons may seek and obtain correc-
tion of information disseminated by the agency. 88 0MB issued its informa-
tion-quality guidelines on September 28, 2001; most agencies produced their 
own guidelines by the statutory deadline of October 1, 2002. 89 
Whether and/or how the DQA applies to rulemakings remains a matter 
of debate. 90 The dominant agency reading, reflecting OMB's Guidelines, is 
85 . Brief of Amicus Curiae, Montana Attorney General at 5, 6, Kootenai Tribe 
v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 01-3547-2, 01-35539, 01-
3547-6) . 
86. Kootenai Tribe , 313 F.3d at 1116 n.19. 
87. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515(a), 
114 Stat. 2763, 2763A154 (2000). This issue is also discussed herein in 
Environmental and Natural Resources Regulation (infra). 
88. Id. § 515(b)(2)(A). 
89. The 0MB web site links to all agency guidelines from http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/agency _info_qual ity _links.html (last 
vi sited Nov. 21 , 2003). 
90 . For opposing views, compare Memorandum from Scott Slaughter to the 
Center for Regulatory Effectiveness , Federal Agency Authority to Create 
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that there is no per se exemption for rulemaking but that allowances must be 
made on two basic issues, as discussed below. 
1. Dissemination 
Does rulemaking involve the "dissemination" of "information" by the 
rulemaking agency? Much of what makes it into a rulemaking docket is not 
produced, or vouched for, by the agency; rather, it hunts down this material 
or receives it from commenters. If everything in the rulemaking docket must 
satisfy the requirements of quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity that ap-
ply to agency documents, and if the agency must field requests for correction 
from anyone who feels that something in the docket does not meet those 
standards, then the DQA has the potential to significantly disrupt the rulemaking 
process and/or to limit the materials on which the agency can rely in that 
process. 
While mere acceptance of information submitted to the rulemaking docket 
does not constitute the "dissemination," the DQA does apply to information 
that the agency endorses or relies upon.91 Reviewing their varying provisions 
in the agency guidelines is well beyond the scope of this chapter. However, a 
pending dispute involving EPA nicely highlights the central issues. 
EPA is conducting a rulemaking regarding the land application of biosolids 
(i.e., sewage sludge). Responding to an EPA Notice of Data Availability, the 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) submitted comments about the 
health risks caused by dioxin in biosolids. The Center for Regulatory Effec-
tiveness (CRE), the driving private force behind the DQA, objected to the 
scientific validity of these comments.92 CRE asserts that NRDC's comments 
Exemptions from the Data Quality Guidelines (May 29, 2002) (arguing 
that the statute allows for no exceptions, including for rulemaking) , and 
James W. Conrad, Jr., The Information Quality Act - Antiregulatory Costs 
of Mythic Proportions?, 12 KAN. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 521, 539-46 (2003) (same), 
with Center for Progressive Regulation, Comments on EPA Draft Data Qual-
ity Guidelines (May 31, 2002) (arguing that the notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process itself satisfies any applicable DQA requirements), and 
Paul Noe, Leaming to Live with the Data Quality Act, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,224 (2003) (remarks of Professor Sidney Shapiro) (same). 
91. See EPA, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, 
Utility and Integrity of Information Disseminated by the Environmental 
Protection Agency, § 5.3 (Dec. 2002). 
92. See Letter from William G. Kelly, Jr. , Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, 
to Docket Clerk, U.S. EPA (Feb. 27, 2003). 
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fail to meet the information-quality standards of the DQA. The letter is not 
itself a request for correction; rather, it concludes that "[u]se by EPA of the 
NRDC information and assertions would violate Data Quality requirements 
and would lead to filing of Request for Correction by CRE and ultimately the 
need to reject those positions."93 The CRE letter produced a lengthy response 
from the Center for Progressive Regulation (CPR), the most active DQA-
skeptic among nonprofits.94 The CPR letter takes the strong position that the 
DQA simply does not apply to rulemaking, and asks EPA and 0MB (or at 
least the former) to do the same. 
2. Requests for Correction 
Under the Act and OMB's Guidelines, agencies must establish adminis-
trative mechanisms through which affected persons can obtain correction of 
agency information that does not comply with the Act's requirements. No-
tice-and-comment rulemaking can be seen as itself constituting such a mecha-
nism, in which case agencies satisfy the DQA in the rulemaking context by 
satisfying section 553, the National Environmental Policy Act, or other no-
tice-and-comment regime. Here again, specific agency responses have var-
ied, but most if not all have sought to rely on existing mechanisms. For 
example, DOT's Guidelines state that when it seeks comment on information, 
it will ordinarily respond to a request for correction to that information only 
in the "next document we issue in the matter," such as the preamble to the 
final rule.95 In addition, it may reject a request for correction to information 
when the request could have been made in the context of the rulemaking 
proceeding. 
PART III. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
A. E-Government Act of 2002 
With grand aspirations but uncertain effects, the E-Government Act of 
93. Id. at 12. 
94. Letter from Sidney Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Member Scholars, Center for 
Progressive Regulation , to Christine Whitman, U.S. EPA, and John Gra-
ham, OIRA (May 19, 2003). 
95 . U.S . Dep't of Transp., Information Dissemination Quality Guidelines, §§ 
VIII.e(6) , VIII .h (2002), available at http ://dmses.dot .gov/submit/ 
DataQualityGuidelines.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2003). 
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2002,96 signed into law in December 2002, aims to bring the federal govern-
ment into the electronic age. The Act established a new Office of Electronic 
Government, headed by a Senate-approved Administrator, within OMB97 and 
requires or encourages government use of the Internet in a wide variety of 
settings. Section 206, entitled "Regulatory Agencies," has two effects on 
rulemaking. First, it requires agencies to post on the Web "all information 
about that agency required to be published in the Federal Register under 
paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 552(a)."98 At a minimum, this means that 
final rules that must be published in the Federal Register under 552(a)(l) 
must also be posted to the Web. Whether (a)(2) material must also be posted 
is unclear. On the one hand, the section does refer to (a)(2); on the other 
hand, it requires posting only of information "required to be published in the 
Federal Register under paragraph[] ... 2 of section 552(a)." There is no such 
information, since (a)(2) does not require anything to be published in the 
Federal Register.99 On the other hand, section 206 requires, "to the extent 
practicable," agencies engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking to allow 
submission of comments in electronic form and to provide an electronic docket 
in notice-and-comment rulemakings. 100 As discussed in Part II, supra, federal 
agencies have overwhelmingly already taken these steps. 
B. Pending Bills 
Several bills with a meaningful chance of passage would make signifi-
cant changes to the rulemaking process. 101 
96. E-Govemment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, I 16 Stat. 2899 (2002). 
91 . Id. § 101 (to be codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3602). 
98. Id. § 206 (b) (to be codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note). 
99. For a fuller discussion of the Act 's ambiguities with regard to what must be 
posted to agency Web sites under both section 206 and section 207, see 
Michael B. Gerrard & Michael Herz, Harnessing Information Technology 
to Improve the Environmental Impact Review Process, 12 NYU ENVTL. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2003). 
100. E-Govemment Act §§ 206 (c) ("To the extent practicable, agencies shall 
accept submissions under section 553(c) of title 5, United States Code, by 
electronic means ."), (d) (requiring, "to the extent practicable," that agen-
cies maintain an electronic docket that includes all submitted comments as 
well as "other materials that by agency rule or practice are included in the 
rulemaking docket"). 
101. As would one with next to no chance of passage but which merits mention 
because the proposal is bold. As he has done in prior Congresses, Rep. J.D. 
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1. H.R. 2432, Paperwork and Regulatory Improvements Act 
This proposed amendment to the Paperwork Reduction Act aims to in-
crease regulatory accounting and evaluation. Section 5 of the bill would make 
permanent an existing pilot project under which the General Accounting Of-
fice (GAO) is to respond to congressional requests for an evaluation of pro-
posed regulations. The theory seems to be that congressional oversight of the 
rulemaking process, whether through oversight hearings, new legislation, the 
Congressional Review Act, or direct participation in the notice-and-comment 
process, would be enhanced by an "independent" evaluation of agency regu-
lations. Second, the bill contains a number of provisions to promote "regula-
tory accounting." Most important, it would (a) require agencies to submit 
annual estimates of the costs and benefits resulting from their rules and (b) 
set up "pilot projects in regulatory budgeting" at five agencies (Labor, Trans-
portation, EPA, and two others selected by 0MB). 
2. H.R. 1772, Small Business Advocacy Improvement Act 
In the 107th Congress, both the House and the Senate passed versions of 
Hayworth (R-AZ) has introduced a bill that would require congressional 
enactment for any agency rule (except for those exempted from section 
553 's notice-and-comment requirements) to be effective. See the Congres-
sional Responsibility Act, H.R. l IO, 108th Cong. (2003). A Senate version 
is not currently pending, although in years past Sen. Sam Brownback (R-
KS) has introduced one. See, e.g ., S. 908, 107th Cong. (2001); see also 
Legislative Oversight of Significant Regulations Act of 2003, H.R. 1654, 
108th Cong. (2003) (similar proposal requiring that any significant agency 
regulation be embodied in a joint resolution before it could take effect). 
Rep. Hayworth 's bill would establish a fast-track, limited debate proce-
dure for considering agency regulations in the form of a bill. As its title 
indicates, the bill purports to be a response to familiar concerns with the 
Congress's delegation of legislative authority to the agencies, aiming to 
ensure more democratic and accountable policymaking. It seems highly 
unlikely that it would have any such effect in the real world. Rather, the 
bill's most important effects would be (a) an overall reduction in regulatory 
activity, and (b) the elimination of judicial review of agency rulemaking 
under the APA. The latter consequence is implicit in the fact of enactment of 
regulations as statutes, and explicit in section 7 of the bill, which states that 
a regulation contained in an enacted bill would not constitute "agency 
action" under the APA. 
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a bill aimed at increasing the strength and independence of the Small Busi-
ness Administration's Office of Advocacy (Advocacy). 102 Such legislation 
was reintroduced in the 108th Congress, and a "Small Business Advocacy 
Improvement Act of 2003" passed the House on June 24, 2003. The bill's 
findings assert that "[e]xcessive regulations continue to burden the Nation's 
small businesses" and that "[f]ederal agencies continue to propose regulations 
that impose disproportionate burdens on small businesses." 103 The legislation 
would increase the rank, staffing, and budget of the Office and make its 
funding a specific line item in the federal budget. While the goal seems to be 
to empower an anti-regulatory watchdog within the government, the legisla-
tion would not make meaningful substantive changes to Advocacy's authority 
or statutory duties. 
3. H.R. 338, Defense of Privacy Act 
This bill would add a new section 553a to the Administrative Procedure 
Act, requiring agencies to prepare initial and final "privacy impact state-
ments" as part of any notice-and-comment rulemaking. The bill is modeled 
closely on the Regulatory Flexibility Act, which requires agencies to consider 
the impacts of regulations on small businesses. Indeed, it comes close to just 
substituting "the privacy of individuals" for every occurrence of "small busi-
nesses" in the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Thus, the bill would not directly 
limit the gathering, use, or disclosure of personal information about indi-
viduals; rather, it trusts that forcing the agency to stop and think about, and to 
make public, its decisions in this regard will induce the appropriate level of 
respect for individual privacy. 
It does not appear that this bill is on the verge of being enacted. How-
ever, an earlier version did pass the House in the 107th Congress.104 The bill 
has strong supporters from distant places on the political spectrum. It was 
introduced by the conservative Rep. Steve Chabot (R-OH) but is co-spon-
sored by the liberal Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), and at a House hearing in July 
2003, strong support was offered by both the American Conservative Union 
and the American Civil Liberties Union. Thus, it may have some political 
viability. Nonetheless, in the administrative law community there is a general 
consensus that the last thing the rulemaking process needs is yet another 
102. See DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE 2001-2002 
166-67 (Jeffrey S. Lubbers ed. , 2003). 
103. H.R. 1772, §§ 2(a)(I), (2) , 108th Cong. (2001). 
104. H.R. 4561, 107th Cong. (2002) , 148 Cong. Rec. H7033 (Oct. 7, 2002). 
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analytic or impact statement requirement. A 1992 ABA House of Delegates 
policy questions the value of such analyses and urges restraint in requiring 
them. Consistent with that policy, in 2002, the ABA took a reasonably firm, 
though just slightly hedged, position opposing the then-pending version of 
this legislation. 105 
105. See Letter from Robert D. Evans, ABA Government Affairs Director, to Rep. 
Robert Barr (May 7, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ 
policy _letters/fappaletter.html (last visited October 31, 2003). 
